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ACCOUNTING AND ACCOUNTABILITY: OVERVIEW OF
THE ACCOUNTING PROVISIONS OF THE FOREIGN
CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT OF 1977
THOMAS E. BAKER*
Corporate accounting techniques and practices for publicly held com-
panies' have been the focus of increased scrutiny and debate. The account-
ing provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 19772 (FCPA) have
focused attention on technical matters and procedures, as well as certain
broader issues regarding the role of accounting and accountants, and the
manner in which corporate management itself is responsible for-preventing
wrongdoing. The accounting provisions of the FCPA generally require pub-
licly held corporations to keep books, records and accounts and to main-
tain a system of internal accounting controls meeting specified objectives.3
The impact and reach of these provisions has raised far broader questions
of corporate accountability. These questions relate to the evaluation, by
* B.S. University of Notre Dame, 1953; LL.B. 1960, LL.M. 1962, Georgetown University
Law Center; LL.M. (Taxation) New York University, 1965. Member of New York, Texas and
Virginia Bars. The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Timothy J. Howard (B.A.
University of Michigan 1974; J.D. Harvard Law School 1977. Member of Texas Bar) in the
preparation of this article.
IA publicly held company is a corporation that has a class of securities registered
pursuant to § 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act), 15 U.S.C. § 781, and must
file reports pursuant to § 15(d) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d) (1976).
2 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1794 (codified in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) [hereinafter cited as FCPA]. The FCPA's accounting provi-
sions were codified as an amendment to § 13(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2) (Supp.
11976). See note 3 infra. The FCPA also contains prohibitions on foreign bribery. This article
discusses only the accounting provisions.
The FCPA's accounting provisions provide that:
every issuer which has a class of securities registered pursuant to section 12 of [the
1934 Act] and every issuer which is required to file reports pursuant to section 15(d)
of [the 1934 Act] shall:
(A) make and keep books, records, and accounts, which, in reasona-
ble detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and disposi-
tions of the assets of the issuer; and
(B) devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls
sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that-
(i) transactions are executed in accordance with management's gen-
eral or specific authorization;
(ii) transactions are recorded as necessary (I) to permit preparation
of financial statements in conformity with generally accepted ac-
counting principles or any other criteria applicable to such state-
ments, and (II) to maintain accountability for assets;
(iii) access to assets is permitted only in accordance with manage-
ment's general or specific authorization; and
(iv) the recorded accountability for assets is compared with the ex-
isting assets at reasonable intervals and appropriate action is taken
with respect to any differences.
15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2) (Supp. I 1976).
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means of accounting techniques, of management's performance of its stew-
ardship responsibilities, and the accountability of management for alloca-
tion of, and financial reporting for corporate assets. The FCPA is one
example of legislation that turns increased scrutiny on management and,
to some extent, the internal affairs of the corporation. Improvements in the
process of corporate governance, including refinements in accounting pro-
cedures and increased accountability to shareholders, should be accom-
plished without seriously inhibiting the ability of corporate management
to manage efficiently and achieve the corporation's principal objectives.
This article is an overview and summary of the accounting provisions
of the FCPA. However, the terms and requirements of the FCPA reflect
developing views and opinions regarding proper means and degrees of ac-
countability for corporate actions, the role of accounting principles therein,
and the standard of duty and responsibility of corporate management.
Therefore, these general issues will be highlighted when appropriate in the
course of the analysis of the FCPA's provisions.
I. AcCOUNTABILITY IN GENERAL
The Honorable Harold M. Williams has defined corporate accountabil-
ity as simply "the process by which managers are held responsible for the
result of their stewardship."' Corporate financial performance is an ob-
vious component of corporate accountability. The sentiment has been ex-
pressed, however, that corporate accountability also includes meeting the
company's social responsibilities, complying with laws, and supervising
carefully the internal conduct of business and affairs. The goal of corporate
accountability in this expanded sense can be reached by implementing a
system that includes internal controls, effective accounting and auditing,
careful structuring, responsibilities of management, oversight by boards of
directors and their committees, and public disclosures. 5 Corporate codes
of business ethics and conduct, legal compliance programs and formal
policy and control procedures may be considered parts of corporate ac-
countability systems. While codes of conduct may be appropriate, it is
improper and counterproductive to apply the label "ethical business" or
"unethical conduct" in the absence of a clearly drawn requirement for
conduct which is based on a general consensus, tempered by deliberation,
and properly defined. A distinction should be clearly drawn in any case,
between performance in the sense of corporate financial reporting, and
accountability according to expanded social standards. Legislative moni-
toring and regulation of accounting practice to achieve goals of substantive
regulation of corporate conduct raises serious questions on both practical
and theoretical levels. Additional accounting procedures and standards
I Address by Harold M. Williams, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission,
Sixth Annual Securities Regulation Institute, San Diego, California (January 18, 1979).
' See generally Moss, The Crisis of Corporate Accountability: A Legislator's View, J.
CORP. L. 251 (1978).
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may become excessively burdensome, and raise difficulties regarding the
nature, extent and source of some legal duties.
The functions corporate accounting serves as part of a trend toward
greater accountability are rapidly developing due to the influence of legis-
lation such as the FCPA and refinements introduced by the Securities and
Exchange Commission (Commission) and self-governance bodies in the
accounting profession. Like any science or art, however, corporate account-
ing has limitations. Its primary purpose is to record clearly and accurately
financial data and information, and compile the. same into usable state-
ments of financial condition. To the extent corporate accounting is as-
signed the primary role in auditing and monitoring to ensure overall corpo-
rate accountability, corporations will incur unreasonable burdens and ex-
penses and the public will develop expectations that probably will remain
unfulfilled. Some goals cannot be attained by reliance on corporate ac-
counting techniques, however expanded and refined those techniques may
become.
H. CORPORATE ACcOUNTING GENERALLY
While the accounting provisions of the FCPA do not specifically refer
to or define generally accepted accounting principles, the statutory terms
should be read in light of the established and accepted practices of the
accounting profession.
Basically, accounting may be defined as "[t]he recording and report-
ing of transactions."' This function involves techniques for recognition of
a corporate transaction, including the appropriate timing and quantifica-
tion of a transaction, the processing of transactions, recording and group-
ing of transactions, internal checking of transactions, and reporting, both
internally and externally to others, such as in financial statements.7 From
a practical point of view, accounting is "the science and art of systemati-
cally recording, presenting, and interpreting the financial facts of an...
enterprise."' Accounting practices are always carried out with the goal of
providing management with the financial information necessary to dis-
charge responsibilities, including those of a fiduciary nature, and to ap-
prise investors and others of the financial condition of an enterprise? An
E. KOHLER, A DICTIONARY FOR ACCOUNTANTS (4th ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as A
DICTIONARY FOR ACCOUNTANTS].
I Id. Although authorities differ on the terminology used to define accounting, the con-
cepts underlying the definitions are generally similar. Compare G. MACFARLAND & R. AYARS,
ACCOUNTING FUNDAMENTALS 1 (1947) with P. GRADY, AMERICAN INSTUTITE OF CERTIFIED PUBUC
ACCOUNTANTS (AICPA) ACCOrTING RESEARCH STUDY No. 7; INVENTORY OF GENERALLY Ac-
CEPTED ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES FOR BUSImSS ENTERPRmSES, 2-4 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
RESEARCH STUDY No. 7].
G. MACFARLAND & R. AYAm, ACCOUNTING FUNDAMENTALS 1 (1947).
Accounting is the body of knowledge and functions concerned with system-
atic originating, authenicating, recording, classifying, processing, summarizing,
analyzing, interpreting, and supplying of dependable and significant information
covering transactions and events which are, in part at least, of a financial character,
1979]
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accounting system can only provide the information and disclosure data
necessary to the discharge of managerial duties; it can not ensure that
those duties will in fact be performed. Neither will an auditing system of
reasonable cost ensure that all those duties will in fact be performed pro-
perly.
While the Commission has the authority to establish accounting stan-
dards,"0 this function has traditionally been relegated by the Commission"
to the private sector, now through the Financial Accounting Standards
Board (FASB). The Commission, of course, retains oversight responsibility
and from time to time makes known its opinion both on matters of profes-
sional concern and the performance of the FASB itself. The Commission
is not bound to accept traditional views on the formulations of accounting
principles devised by the FASB or its predecessor organizations.' 2 While
the FASB undertakes numerous projects of significance to financial report-
ing generally, a current study project most germane to the issues of ac-
counting and accountability is one entitled "Conceptual Framework for
Financial Accounting and Reporting."' 3 The project addresses matters
such as the objectives of a financial statement, the qualitative characteris-
tics of the information contained therein, and the basic measuring devices
to be employed in compiling the pertinent information. Recently, in its
first pronouncement" relating to the objectives of financial reporting, the
required for the management and operation of an entity and for the reports that
have to be submitted thereon to meet fiduciary and other responsibilities.
RESEARCH STUDY No. 7, supra note 7, at 4.
15 U.S.C.. §§ 77s, 78w (1976).
I See SEC Accounting Release No. 4, (April 25, 1938), reprinted in 5 FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 72,005. The Commission will assume that financial statements are misleading unless
there is support for the accounting principles upon which the statements are based. Id.
Recently the Commission has taken the position that official Financial Accounting Standards
Board (FASB) Statements and Interpretations will provide the requisite support for the use
of accounting principles in preparing financial statements. SEC Accounting Release No. 150
(December 20, 1973), reprinted in 5 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 72,172.
2 For example, the Commission is presently developing accounting standards, with re-
spect to oil and gas producing activities, that are not consistent with past practices. The
Commission's concern for the adequacy of corporate accountability in the oil and gas produc-
ing market stems from a perceived failure of traditional accounting methods to reflect pro-
perly companies' operational results and financial position. SEC Securities Act Release No.
5966, (August 31, 1978), reprinted in 6 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) § 72,275. Most significantly,
the Commission indicated that traditional accounting for gas and oil reserves was no longer
satisfactory. Id. Pending an investigation to establish a uniform accounting system, the
Commission promulgated rules requiring oil and gas producers to issue supplemental earnings
summaries in connection with their financial reporting. 17 C.F.R. § 210.3-18 (1977). See SEC
Securities Act Release No. 6006 and 6007, (December 19, 1978), reprinted in 6 FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 72,279-280.
13 FASB, DISCUSSION MEMORANDUM, CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING
AND REPORTING: ELEMENTS OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND THEIR MEASUREMENTS (1976); FASB,
TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS ON OBJECTIVES OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISE
(1976); FASB, SCOPE AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK PROJECT (1976).
14 FASB, STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING CONCEPTS No. 1 OBJECTIVES OF FINANCIAL
REPORTING BY BUSINESS ENTERPRISES (November 1978).
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FASB indicated that the objectives pertain to financial reporting gener-
ally, and are not limited to communicating information through financial
statements.'5 From a practical standpoint, "[flinancial reporting should
provide information that is useful to present and potential investors and
creditors and other users in making rational investment, credit, and simi-
lar decisions."'" Moreover, the statement indicates that financial reporting
should show how management has discharged its stewardship responsibili-
ties to shareholders in the use of the enterprise's resources, with particular
focus on the earnings information. The statement emphasizes, however,
that financial reporting, and especially financial statements, normally do
not offer a basis for assessing management performance apart from the
enterprise financial performance."
Traditionally, corporate management and not the board of directors
or independent accountants has taken the primary responsibility for finan-
cial reporting of accounting results for publicly held corporations. The
Commission forty years ago stated its view on the assignment of primary
responsibility for the reporting of financial information:
[t]he fundamental and primary responsibility for the accuracy of
information filed with the Commission and disseminated among
the investors rests upon management. Management does not dis-
charge its obligations in this respect by employment of indepen-
dent public accountants, however reputable .... [An independent
accountant's opinion is not a] substitute for management's ac-
counting of its stewardship, but as a check upon that accounting.'
This principle has been reaffirmed by the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants' (AICPA) "Cohen Commission Report."" The Report
differentiated management's direct responsibility for financial statements
from the independent accountant's audit responsibility. Internal audit re-
sponsibility is also distinguished.
I. DEFINITIONS
The legislative history of the FCPA indicates that the meaning of terms
used in the statutory language should be obtained from generally accepted
accounting principles."' Presumably these definitions will change as ac-
counting terms develop and become more sophisticated.
"Id. at 3.
" Id. at 16.
' Id. at 25-26.
"In re Interstate Hosiery Mills, Inc., 4 S.E.C. 706, 721 (1939). See also SEC Accounting
Release No. 62, (June 27, 1947), reprinted in FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 72,081.
" AICPA, THE COMMISSION ON AUDITORS' RESPONSIBILrrIES REPORT, CONCLUSION, AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 8-9 (1978).
20 The legislative history contains numerous references to authoritative accounting liter-
ature or specific references therein. See Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission
on Questionable and Illegal Payments and Practices, Submitted to the U.S. Senate Commit-
tee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs on May 12, 1976, at 59, 67 [hereinafter cited as
1979]
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A. Assets
The term "assets" has been defined as representing "expected future
economic benefits, rights to which have been acquired by the enterprise
as a result of some current or past transaction. ' 21 In terms of ownership,
an asset "represents either a property right or value acquired, or an ex-
penditure made which has created a property right or is properly applica-
ble to the future. ' 22 These definitions normally look to the tangible nature
of the item, and involve an assessment that the item will endure for some
period into the future. Intangible values generated in the ordinary course
of business rather than purchased, such as research results, advertising
promotion and special technical competence are not normally recognized
as assets.23 Research activities, for example, are normally expensed.24 The
cost of intangibles purchased from others to be used in conjunction with
research activities, however, is to be capitalized and amortized. 2
Past definitions have not always reflected the practices under generally
accepted accounting principles. 28 The definition of assets within the con-
text of authoritative accounting literature is, in fact, currently undergoing
review.?7 Moreover, courts in the past have questioned whether the ac-
counting definition is dispositive on all issues. In United States v. Simon,2
SEC May 12 Report]; SEN. REP. No. 114, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 8, reprinted in [1977] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4098, 4106 [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT].
1, AICPA ACCOUNTING RESEARCH STUDY No. 3, A TENTATIVE SET OF BROAD ACCOUNTING
PRINCIPLES FOR BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 8 (1962) [hereinafter cited as RESEARCH STUDY No. 3].
Assets also represent property rights, value acquired and expenditures that either create
property rights or are properly applicable to the future. RESEARCH STUDY No. 7, supra note 7,
at 227.
22 RESEARCH STUDY No. 7, supra note 7, at 227.
2 FASB, STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS No. 2, ACCOUNTING FOR RE-
SEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT COSTS (October 1974).
24 Id.
2 Id. at 5.
" See RESEARCH STUDY No. 3, supM note 21, at 60, 80.
21 The FASB recognizes, for instance, that not all items includable as assets in financial
reports according to its definitions of assets will necessarily be recognized as assets.
Present practice for recognizing assets is determined by conventions and rules that
have developed over many years and generally are beyond the scope of this Discus-
sion Memorandum (paragraph 11-22). Thus, definitions discussed determine the
items that are eligible to be included in assets and combine with decisions about
recognition and measurement to determine the assets that should be included in
the financial statements of a particular enterprise at a particular time.
FASB DISCUSSION MEMORANDUM, supra note 13, at 75.
- 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969). In Simon, the government claimed that Continental
Vending Machine Corporation's accountants had inadequately disclosed the nature of the
company's accounts receivable. Id. at 801. The trial court had instructed the jury that if the
financial statements did not fairly represent the company's financial position the dispositive
issue was whether the accountants had acted in good faith. Id. at 805. The defendants had
produced accounting experts who testified that the accounting procedures used conformed
with generally accepted accounting principles and auditing standards. Id. However, the court
charged the jury that conformity with profession-wide standards were merely evidence of good
faith conduct. Id. at 805-06. The Second Circuit agreed, noting that generally accepted
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the Second Circuit held that the definition of an "asset" under generally
accepted accounting principles merited substantial consideration but was
not dispositive in deciding whether accountants had adequately fulfilled
their duties. At issue was the nature of a receivable which the auditing
accountants had allowed to be carried as an asset with only footnote disclo-
sure. While expert testimony and authoritative literature demonstrated
that the receivable was an "asset," the court would apply that evidence
only to the issue of good faith, and not to exonerate the accountants as a
matter of law. Further disclosure may therefore be mandated in order to
make the financial statement not misleading under the securities laws,
even if the item clearly has the characteristics of an asset. The Commis-
sion's standards for disclosure at times may reach beyond definitional
matters as expressed in accounting literature.
While statutory terms and regulatory guides are helpful in determining
whether certain items fit the category of "assets" in discrete fact situa-
tions, these provisions and legal concepts are not determinative. 29 Often
the ultimate determining factor should be sound judgment based on rele-
vant facts. Regulation S-X,1° concerning the form and content of financial
statements, deals with specific categories of assets to be set forth in the
financial statements, and the proper aggregation and segregation of the
assets. Those items deemed "assets" under authoritative accounting liter-
ature should be segregated in accordance with generally accepted account-
ing principles as separate stated amounts in the financial reports of a
business enterprise. For reporting purposes, however, assets may some-
times be aggregated or excluded under the test of materiality. For instance,
Rule 3.02 of Regulation S-X provides, "[i]f the amount which would
otherwise be required to be shown with respect to any item is not material,
it need not be separately set forth." 31 Thus, the accounting definition of
"assets" is the touchstone for the interpretation of statutory and regulatory
terms in general, though the general definition can be overridden or su-
perseded by express language establishing a separate rule in a given con-
text. The accounting provisions of the FCPA, however, do not evidence any
intent to establish a separate definition of assets. Consequently, as the
definition of assets is developed and refined under generally accepted ac-
accounting principles do not establish accountants' disclosure responsibilities when the audi-
tor has reason to believe that the company's affairs are not conducted honestly. The court
stated that "[p]roof of compliance with generally accepted standards was 'evidence which
may be very persuasive but not necessarily conclusive that he acted in good faith, and the
facts as certified were not materially false or misleading."' Id. at 805-06. Simon thus indicates
that adherence to generally accepted accounting principles in reportifig the nature of assets
will not automatically insulate an auditor from liability for acting in bad faith.
1 See note 27 supra.
31 See 17 C.F.R. § 210.3-02 (1978). Regulation S-X establishes the requisite form and
contents of financial statements. 17 C.F.R. § 210.1-01 (1978). Section 210.3-03 states that if
amounts required to be shown under the regulation are immaterial, they need not be sepa-
rately set forth in the reporting company's financial statement.
3, 17 C.F.R. § 210.3-02 (1978).
-1979]
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counting concepts and authoritative accounting literature, such concepts
should apply to the accounting provisions of the FCPA.
B. Transaction
Similarly, the term "transaction" should be defined according to gener-
ally accepted accounting principles and authoritative accounting litera-
ture. "Transaction" has been defined as "an economic event that has been
recognized as having such an effect, rendered in a form that can be pro-
cessed, and accepted for processing by one or more of the entity's account-
ing systems."" As used in the accounting context, a transaction relates to
changes in assets, that is their receipt, expenditure or conversion. Changes
in assets may occur in an exchange of assets, increase or decrease of an
asset for a corresponding change in a liability or obligation, acquisition of
an asset in exchange for performance of services, or a decrease of an asset
with a corresponding decrease in a liability or obligation or an increase in
assets due to receipt of services rendered. Transactions also include the
internal transfer or conversion of an asset from one form to another, or
consumption within the entity to generate revenue.
Since the time period in which changes and occurences are recognized
is crucial to proper accounting procedures,3 the timing of transaction re-
cording and recognition must be consistent with generally accepted ac-
counting principles. A transaction is in effect, an economic event that,
under generally accepted accounting principles, has the status that re-
quires recognition. 4 For example, accounting convention does not require
under all circumstances the recordation of executory contracts,. except in
appropriate form as commitments or contingent liabilities, until such con-
tracts can be considered "firm commitments for the acquisition of perma-
nent or long-term investments and property, plant and equipment and for
the purchase, repurchase, construction or rental of assets under material
leases." 5 When items are treated as expenses rather than assets, as is the
case for costs for research, proper recordation of the expenses is necessary
in order that they be reflected fairly in financial statements in all material
respects."
The internal accounting control provisions of the FCPA require that
transactions be authorized by management. Prior to such authorization
and approval, a corporate transaction should not be executed, nor should
access to assets be permitted. When a properly executed transaction
32 ARTHUR ANDER§EN & Co., A GUIDE FOR STUDYING AND EVALUATING INTERNAL ACCOUNTING
CONTROLS 11 (1978).
11 See RESEARCH STUDY No. 3, sdpra note 21, at 6-7 (describing the term "time period"
as a "basic postulate" and stating that a function of accounting is "to assign the changes to
specified periods of time.")
' See INTERNAL ACCOUNTING CONTROLS, supra note 32, at 11. See also A DICTIONARY FOR
ACCOUNTANTS, supra note 6, at 430-31.
- 17 C.F.R. § 210.3-16(i) (1978).
- Id. §§ 210.1-01, 5-02 (1978).
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should be recorded in the accounting records depends in part upon the
nature and timing of the transaction. The term "transaction" has a spe-
cific accounting meaning to which reference must be made in making such
decisions.1
7
C. Books, Records and Accounts
While the scope of the term "books, records and accounts" as used in
the FCPA35 may seem self-evident, the Commission has suggested that it
embraces various sorts of underlying data and information. This is of some
concern because it constitutes an extension of the reach of the FCPA.
Section 3(a)(37) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the 1934 Act),
defines the term "records" to mean "accounts, correspondence, memoran-
dums, tapes, discs, papers, books, and other documents or transcribed
information of any type, whether expressed in ordinary or machine lan-
guage."39 Arguably, new section 13(b)(2) rejects the section 3(a)(37) defini-
tion, since, if the definition had been intended, the terms "books" and
"accounts" would not have been needed in the FCPA provision, and spe-
cific reference would have been made in the legislative history to section
3(a)(37). Notably, in its SEC May 12 Report the Commission used the
term "books, records and accounts" without a specific explanation. The
use of the term in section 13(b)(2) implies an adoption of the accounting
definition, rather than the strict section 3(a) (37) definition. The reasona-
ble conclusion is that the term "books, records and accounts" relates to
the accounting journals, ledgers and other accounting papers required with
respect to the art of accounting; which art may be described as the
"classifying [recognizing] and recording, presenting, and interpreting of
the financial facts [transactions]" after they have been authorized."
References to "underlying data," according to authoritative accounting
literature," are not necessarily references to "books and accounts" in the
securities laws sense. Discussions of the term "evidential matter," which
is a general designation referring to various types of data used by the
auditor, distinguish "underlying accounting data" from "all corroborating
information available to the auditor." "The books of original entry, the
37 AICPA STATEMENT ON AUDITING STANDARDS No. 1, T 320.42 (November
1972)[hereinafter cited as AICPA STATEMENT No. 1]. See A DiCTIoNARY FOR AccoUNTANTS,
supra note 6 at 430-31; P. MASON, FUNDAMENTALS OF AccOUNTING, 21-28 (2d ed. 1947).
15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A) (Supp. 1 1976); see note 3 supra.
' 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(37) (Supp. 1 1976).
SEC May 12 Report, supra note 20, at 63.
' G. MAcFARLAND & R. AYARS, supra note 8, at 1. The distinction that the AICPA draws
between "underlying accounting data" and "all corroborating information available to the
auditor" can serve to delineate the scope of the term "books, records and accounts" in the
FCPA. Underlying accounting data is the term most analogous to the FCPA's phrase. It
includes "[tihe books of original entry, the general and subsidiary ledgers, and such informal
and memorandum records as work sheets supporting cost allocations, computations, and
reconciliations. AICPA STATEMENT No. 1, supra note 37, 330.03-07.
12 See AICPA STATEMENT No. 1, supra note 37, T 330.03-07.
1979]
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general and subsidiary ledgers, related accounting manuals, and such in-
formal and memorandum records as work sheets supporting cost alloca-
tions, computations, and reconciliations all constitute evidence in support
of financial statements" and are "underlying accounting data."4 Any ma-
terials beyond those directly affecting the reliability of the financial state-
ments and the accountability for assets, while important to the auditor's
job, should not be encompassed within the term "books, records and ac-
counts" in the FCPA.
In all cases, definitions of these terms should be drawn from authorita-
tive accounting literature. This is demonstrated by the legislative history.
In the SEC May 12 Report, the Commission stated its belief "that any
legislation in this area should embody a prohibition against the falsifica-
tion of corporate accounting records."" Senator Proxmire had previously
in S. 3133 proposed to give the Commission by rule or regulation the
authority to define the form of the information that books, records and
accounts should contain. 5 Since the legislation was directed at certain
shortcomings of corporate accounting records, and since the Commission
was not given explicit authority to define form and content, the term
"books, records and accounts" should be understood to be limited to those
documents which reflect the accounting for transactions and for the dispo-
sitions of assets by the corporation. This may include the underlying ac-
counting data and documents evidencing or supporting such transactions
or dispositions of assets,48 but the phrase should be construed in accord-
ance with accounting princples, and not extended indiscriminately.
IV. BOOKKEEPING PROVISIONS
Subsection A of the FCPA (Subsection A) imposes upon publicly held
corporations the obligation to "make and keep books, records and ac-
counts, which in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the trans-
actions."47 The existing sanctions of general application in the 1934 Act 48
may be imposed for violations of the FCPA accounting provisions. While
corporate management has a clear obligation to implement and maintain
proper bookkeeping procedures that meet the statutory requirements,
management should not be saddled with an absolute obligation to insure
or guarantee against any insignificant, unintentional errors or isolated ir-
regularities.
Id. 330.03-04.
4, SEC May 12 Report, supra note 20, at 58.
122 CONG. REc. S3,279 (daily ed. March 11, 1976) (remarks of Sen. Proxmire).
, See AICPA STATEMENT No. 1, supra note 37, 330.01-05.
,7 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A) (Supp. I 1976); see note 3 supra.
4See Report by the Committee on Corporate Law and Accounting, A Guide to the New
Section 13(b)(2) Accounting Requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 34 Bus.
LAw. 307, 320-22 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Guide]. The Commission has made clear that
the FCPA's bookkeeping provisions supplement rather than displace, the 1933 and 1934 Act's
general disclosure requirements. See SEC Exchange Act Release No. 14478, (February 16,
1978), reprinted in 6 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 72,264.
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Further, this limited reading of subsection A is particularly justified
when management has no active and deliberate role in the errors, or when
the errors or irregularities are detected in a timely manner by employees
or auditors in the normal course of performing their assigned functions.
Subsection A should not be read to impose substantive requirements and
duties beyond those already found in generally accepted accounting princi-
ples. For instance, the FCPA should not increase the number of accounts
maintained in the corporate books according to generally accepted princi-
ples and practices.
A. Adequacy
While Subsection A was based on similar language in the SEC May
12 Report,49 there is a notable difference in that the statutory language
inserts the phrase "in reasonable detail." The Conference Report indicated
in relevant part that:
[t]he conference committee adopted the 'in reasonable detail'
qualification to the accurate and fair requirement in light of the
concern that such a standard, if unqualified, might connote a de-
gree of exactitude and precision which is unrealistic. The amend-
ment makes clear that the issuer's records should reflect transac-
tions in conformity with accepted methods of recording economic
events' and effectively prevent off-the-books slush funds and pay-
ments of bribes."0
The question of whether books and records are adequate is closely
related to the definition of that term. The broader the definition, the
greater the standard of accuracy will be. While one goal of the FCPA is to
prohibit the falsification of records necessary to disguise illicit activities,
the definition of "books, records and accounts" should be drawn from
authoritative accounting literature, as evidended by the legislative history.
Indiscriminate extension of the definition that disregards accounting prin-
ciples would conflict with the requirement of "reasonable detail," and
disturb what would seem to be an appropriate understanding of
"adequacy."
The system of "books, records and accounts" maintained by a corpora-
tion must be adequate to meet the internal auditing control requirements
of the FCPA.5 ' The two provisions are related in that inadequate or incom-
plete books of account raise serious questions about whether an effective
audit is possible. The internal auditing control requirements state gener-
ally that transactions must be executed according to authorization from
management, that transactions must be recorded properly, that access to
"SEC May 12 Report, supra note 20.
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 831, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 10, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4121, 4122 [hereinafter cited as CONFERENcE REPORT].
11 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B) (Supp. 1 1976) [hereinafter cited as Subsection B]; see note
3 supra; text accompanying notes 74-97 infra.
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assets must be limited and that the records periodically be compared with
reality.2 The reliability of the books and records is a fundamental part of
an effective system of internal accounting controls. The corporate books,
records and accounts must therefore be sufficient to permit preparation of
financial statements in conformity with generally accepted accounting
principles and to maintain proper accountability for assets. This should be
possible, however, without requiring the extensive use of additional books,
records or accounts. Neither is there any suggestion of a need for providing
substantial additional underlying data.
B. Role of State Law
The FCPA does not set forth criteria for determining when a transac-
tion is executed, or access to assets is permitted, according to
"authorization" by management. The question of proper authorization
should be determined with reference to state corporate and agency law and
to authoritative accounting literature. The authorization may be general
or specific and may be granted directly by management or the board of
directors or by delegation of authority from either, in keeping with the
relevant provisions of state law.
Most state corporation laws impose requirements pertaining to the
maintenance of books and records by corporations incorporated under their
laws . 3 The Model Business Corporation Act provides that "each corpora-
tion shall keep correct and complete books and records of account. . .. "-I'
Publicly held corporations have traditionally maintained financial books,
records and accounts for practical reasons, in order to enable them to
furnish financial reports to investors and file financial reports under var-
ious statutes and regulations. A variety of state and federal statutes estab-
lish standards of conduct for recordkeeping functions and prescribe admin-
istrative, civil and criminal sanctions for violations thereof.5
15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B) (Supp. I 1976).
See MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION Acr ANNOTATED 2d § 52, 6 (1971) (citing various
state statutes requiring corporations to keep accounting records).
54 Id. § 52.
1 See 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976) (up to $10,000 fine and 5 year prison sentence for willful
fraud in matters within jurisdiction of federal department or agency); 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a)
(1976) (penalties for willful violation of 1934 Act include imprisonment for up to 5 years).
State law sanction provisions include DEL. CODE tit. 11, §§ 871, 4206 (1974) (falsification of
business records punishable by up to 2 years imprisonment). The Delaware provision defines
the conduct to which the sanctions apply as follows:
[a] person is guilty of falisifying business records when, with intent to defraud,
he:
(1) Makes or causes a false entry in the business records of an enterprise; or
(2) Alters, erases, obliterates, deletes, removes, or destroys a true entry in the
business records of an enterprise; or
(3) Omits to make a true entry in the business records of an enterprise in violation
of a duty to do so which he knows to be imposed upon him by law or by the nature
of his position; or
(4) Prevents the making of a true entry or causes the omission thereof in the
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Congress gave no specific indication in the FCPA of an intent to feder-
alize applicable law on the issue of proper authorization. The guiding
principle, then, as set forth in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, is that
state law controls.
Absent a clear indication of Congressional intent, we are reluctant
to federalize the substantial portion of the law of corporations that
deals with transactions in securities, particularly where estab-
lished state policies of corporate regulation would be overridden.
As the court stated in Cort v. Ash, '[c]orporations are creatures
of state law, and investors commit their funds to corporate direc-
tors on the understanding that, except where federal law expressly
requires certain responsibilities . . . , of directors with respect to
stockholders, state law will govern the internal affairs of the corpo-
ration.' 422 U.S. at 84.58
The requirement of proper authorization must therefore be construed in
light of applicable principles of state law, since those principles tradition-
ally govern questions of authorization and are well established 7 The du-
ties of management implied by the FCPA must likewise be integrated with
state corporate law principles.
C. Standard of Precision
Duly authorized corporate transactions are generally required to be
recorded in a manner which permits them to be stated in the proper
amounts, at the proper times, and classified in the proper accounts." Oth-
business records of an enterprise.
DEL. CODE tit. 11, § 871 (1974).
58 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977). In Green, the Court cited the leading case of Cort v. Ash,
422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975). In Ash, a shareholder brought a derivatiye action alleging violations
of 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1976) which prohibits certain corporate campaign contributions. 422 U.S.
at 67. The Court held that § 610 did not create a private remedy in addition to its criminal
sanctions. Aside from the fact that state law generally governs shareholders' relations with
their corporation, the Court based its holding on three factors. Legislative history of the
Federal Election Campaign Act indicated that § 610 did not create a substantive right in
shareholders. Id. at 80-82. There was no indication that Congress implicitly recognized the
existence of a federal right by creating a shareholder right to damages for violation of § 610.
Id. at 82-84. Moreover, implying a shareholder right under § 610 would not effectuate Con-
gress's intent to minimize corporate influence on the outcome of elections. Id. at 84.
11 See also Burks v. Lasker, 99 S. Ct. 1831 (1979) (state law applies to determine whether
independent directors may discuss a derivative action charging violations of the Investment
Company Act of 1940 and Investment Advisers Act of 1940).
For the proposition that financial statements do not reflect all events potentially
affecting the nature and value of a company's assets, because some corporate transactions
are not of such nature, or do not rise to a level of importance, sufficient to require recording,
see ARTHUR ANDERSEN & Co., A GUIDE FOR STUDYING AND EvALUATING INTERNAL AcCOUNTING
CONTROLS 11 (1978):
It is a postulate of accounting that all economic events that involve the entity in
exchnages with outsiders should be reflected in its financial statements. In addi-
tion, generally accepted accounting principles require that certain economic events
1979]
822 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
erwise, it would not be possible to meet the objectives of permitting
"preparation of financial statements in conformity with generally accepted
accounting principles or other criteria applicable to such statements" and
maintaining "accountability for assets." The AICPA in its Statement on
Auditing Standards No. 1 states, "[r]ecording of transactions compre-
hends all records maintained with respect to the transactions and the
resulting assets or services and all functions performed with respect to such
records." 9 In a larger sense, however, "[tihe accountability function fol-
lows assets from the time of their acquisition in one transaction until their
disposition or use in another . . . [requiring] the maintenance of records
of accountability for assets and periodic comparison of these records with
the related assets.""0 Proper authorization therefore does not complete
management's obligation. There is also a duty to follow through and see
that the records kept are complete and consistent.
Since the legislation relies heavily upon authoritative accounting litera-
ture, the bookkeeping requirements should be construed consistently
therewith. While accuracy and clarity are to be pursued, "[t]he term
'accurately' . . . does not mean exact precision as measured by some ab-
stract principle. Rather, it means that an issuer's records should reflect
transactions in conformity with accepted methods of recording economic
events."6' Insignificant errors, defined in authoritative accounting litera-
ture in part as "unintentional mistakes in financial statements and
includ[ing] mathematical or clerical mistakes in the underlying records
and accounting data. ,"e should not be actionable under the 1934 Act's
sanction provisions. The same analysis has been offered with respect to
occasional errors which do not establish a pattern. 3 While the Commission
has refused to adopt any materiality test to limit the types of errors
deemed actionable, the Commission has stated, "[t]he statute does not
require perfection . . . the legislative history reflects that 'standards of
reasonableness' are to be used . ,, " A limitation of reasonableriess
eliminates concern for errors of a minor nature and impact. Where an error
or irregularity is material but is detected within a timely period by employ-
ees in the normal course of performing their assigned functions, and prior
involving external forces or entities and certain internal economic events also
should be reflected in the financial statements. Thus, some, but not all, economic
events that potentially affect the nature and value of an entity's resources are
reflected in its financial statements. The economic events that are to be reflected
in the financial statements must, therefore, first be selected, or recognized. It is
desirable that, once recognized, they be approved, or authorized.
" AICPA STATEMENT No. 1, supra note 37, 320.24.
" Id. 320.25.
S. REP. No. 1031, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1976).
62 AICPA AUDITING STANDARDS EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, STATEMENT ON AUDITING STAN-
DARDS No. 16, THE INDEPENDENT AUDITOR'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DETECTION OF ERRORS AND
IRREGULARITIES 2 (1977).
13 Guide, supra note 45.
" SEC Exchange Act Release No. 15570 (February 23, 1979), reprinted in [1979 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,959.
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to the publication of financial statements, the corporation should not be
in violation of the FCPA. The purpose of internal accounting controls is
to establish controls that avoid errors and irregularities and, where neces-
sary, find and correct errors and irregularities in a timely manner. The
correction of de minimis errors, when not justified on a cost-benefit deter-
mination, should not be required provided the lack of correction does not
cause any other misstatements or errors in the related internal or external
financial reports.
D. Irregularities
Occasional errors should be distinguished from irregularities of a recur-
ring or deliberate nature, which raise a different and more difficult set of
problems. Such irregularities include "intentional distortions of financial
statements, such as deliberate misrepresentations by management. . . or
misappropriations of assets. . . , omission of significant information from
records or documents; recording of transactions without substance. . . or
misappropriation of assets for the benefit of management .... ."I' A clear
distinction should be made between direct and indirect managerial in-
volvement in this type of irregularity. An irregularity attributable to one
or more employees without any general or specific authorization or knowl-
edge by management, in circumvention of a systemof internal accounting
controls which is otherwise sufficient, should not subject the corporation
or management to liability under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as
long as the irregularity neither materially affects the corporation's finan-
cial statements nor impairs accountability for assets. Persistent irregulari-
ties at lower levels, however, raise serious questions regarding the suffi-
ciency of the internal accounting controls. By contrast, in isolated situa-
tions involving only one member of management acting contrary to corpo-
rate policy and outside the system of internal accounting controls, neither
other members of management nor the corporation should be held ac-
countable absent other facts.
E. Liabilities
As discussed above, some questions arising under the FCPA, such as
the authorization of transactions and the adequacy of books and records,
may be resolved by reference to state law. Similarly, the management of
a corporation must discharge a duty of care owed under state law regard-
ing the maintenance of books and records and the safeguarding of assets.
The responsibilities pertaining to proper maintenance of financial
books, records and accounts should be considered from the separate view-
points of the corporation as an entity, of the directors, of management, and
of the employees directly responsible. In his role of overseeing and directing
the business and affairs of a corporation, a director performing his duties
15 See STATEMENT No. 16, supra note 62, 3.
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"in good faith, in a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best inter-
ests of the corporation, and with such care as an ordinarily prudent person
in a like position would use under similar circumstances," should be af-
forded the right to rely on the books, records and accounts and have no
liability with respect thereto." In making a judgment as to the reliability
or completeness of such books, records and accounts, however, a director
must exercise proper care. 7
The duties of management 8 in charge of the daily conduct of the busi-
ness and affairs of a corporation are more exacting and constant than those
of a board of directors. In performing their duties, members of manage-
ment should also have the right to rely on the books, records and accounts,
so long as they act in good faith and exercise proper care. 9 Under normal
conditions, members of management having direct control over the books,
records and accounts should have greater responsibility and higher duties
of care. A particular member of management having specific authority
over and responsibility for a particular transaction would possess greater
accountability for that transaction.
The requirement that management maintain proper accounting books,
records and accounts" does not make management a guarantor of the
completeness, veracity and reliability of all accounting books, records and
accounts. Conscientious compliance with the bookkeeping provisions of
the FCPA will not eradicate the inadvertent errors that occur from time
to time. Non-management employees may deliberately falsify the record-
ing of some transactions. Under some circumstances, mistakes or fraud
would be neither material to the corporate enterprise nor result in distorted
reporting of financial information. In some cases management will not be
involved in any deliberate action or collusion, and the decision-making
process of management will not be adversely affected. In any event, it
should be recognized that not all illegal acts are recorded in the books,
records and accounts of a corporation. In some instances non-management
employees may deliberately circumvent the internal controls of a corpora-
tion. While such employees should be punished, neither management nor
" Where directors are statutorily authorized to rely on the corporate officer's accounts
and reports, there is usually a requirement that the reliance be.in good faith. See DEL. CODE,
tit. 8, § 141(e) (1974). Section 35 of the Model Business Corporation Act further qualifies a
director's right of reliance by requiring a director to act "in a manner he reasonably believes
to be in the best interests of the corporation, and with such care as an ordinarily prudent
person in a like position would use under similar circumstances." MODEL BUSINESS CORPORA-
TION AcT ANNOTATED 2d § 35 (Supp. 1974).
,7 See Report of Committee on Corporate Laws, Changes in the Model Business Corpora-
tion Act, 29 Bus. LAW. 947, 954-55 (1974).
" There is a distinction between corporate management and boards of directors. While
management conducts the company's daily business and affairs, directors oversee the com-
pany's operation.
" See H. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS §§ 62-64 at 157-58, 165-66 (1946); W. FLETCHER,
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 991, 1031-32, 2203 (rev. perm. ed. 1975)
[hereinafter cited as W. FLETCHER].
11 W. FLETCHER, supra note 69, §§ 2187-88.
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the corporation itself should be subject to sanctions, so long as manage-
ment acted in good faith, the corporation had a sufficient system of inter-
nal accounting controls under the circumstances, the corporation's finan-
cial reporting was not materially affected, and the corporation's accounta-
bility for assets was not significantly affected.
Subsection A of the FCPA must be construed in context and in light
of its purpose as a part of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, in order to
avoid incorrect and troubling implications regarding its breadth and cover-
age. For example, Subsection A requires keeping books, records and ac-
counts sufficient to enable reporting in compliance with the federal securi-
ties laws. Subsection A, however, was not intended to require that such
books, records and accounts be sufficient to prepare reports for other fed-
eral or state agencies or regulatory bodies. Reporting requirements under
other laws may differ in scope or objective from the FCPA. The records the
FCPA requires must be sufficient to determine the amounts of assets,
liabilities, revenues and expenses to be reflected in the financial state-
ments of a publicly held corporation and adequate also to maintain control
over and accountability for assets. The FCPA does not apply, however, to
all other sorts of books, records and accounts of a corporation that might
be kept in order to report or file with any other agency or body, or that
might be maintained for internal administrative purposes. Consequently,
reports, filings and information which are outside the requirements of the
1934 Act, such as reports filed with other governmental bodies or agencies,
should not be covered by the terms of the FCPA.
The impact of the bookkeeping and internal accounting control provi-
sions upon the liabilities and responsibilities of management, directors and
the corporation itself will become apparent only with the passage of time
and as a result of litigation. The reasonable anticipation is that the courts
on balance will apply the provisions with care and deliberation in a manner
which will not be overexacting, counterproductive and costly.' This is
especially necessary in light of the extent and power of various enforcement
paths and liability provisions. The Commission's enforcement responsibili-
ties "extend to conducting investigations, bringing civil injunction actions,
commencing administrative proceedings if appropriate . . . and referring
cases to Justice Department for criminal prosecution where warranted...
."7 The Guide points out clearly that any person engaging in irregularities
is in "jeopardy under the penalty provisions of section 32(a) of the 1934
Act." For these reasons, legal jeopardy under the FCPA should extend
only to members of management deliberately or knowingly contravening
the statutory duty.
T, Cf. Guide, supra note 45, at 311-12 (suggesting that the FCPA's legislative history
dictates standard of reasonableness be used to assess compliance with new § 13(b) accounting
requirements).
12 SEC Exchange Act Release No. 14478 (February 16, 1978), reprinted in 6 FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) T 72,264.
n Guide, supra note 45, at 311.
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In summary, management should have no obligation to ensure against
all errors in the bookkeeping system. Liability should be based only on a
clear breach of duty, or of course, deliberate and willful wrongdoing. The
line drawn between liability and exoneration must depend on the degree
of direct management involvement, materiality of the error and harm to
any person as a result of false reporting.
V. INTERNAL ACCOUNTING CONTROLS
The second part of the accounting provisions of the FCPA (Subsection
B) deals with internal accounting controls. Subsection B requires the es-
tablishment of "a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to pro-
vide reasonable assurances"" that transactions are executed in accordance
with management's authorization and properly recorded for purposes of
financial presentation and accountability for assets. In addition, it man-
dates that assets be acquired or disposed of in accordance with manage-
ment's authorization and requires that recorded assets be periodically rec-
onciled with existing assets. The standard of "reasonable assurances" of
reliability recognizes that no system can be flawless. This implies that
considerations of flexibility, cost-benefit analysis and allowing manage-
ment latitude to make prudent business judgments and take appropriate
remedial steps will be afforded weight in determining the sufficiency of a
program of internal accounting controls. Failure to consider these factors
in evaluating a program would unreasonably restrict management, impair
efficient corporate functioning and impose unnecessary or unreasonable
costs on reporting companies.
The two-fold objectives of reasonable internal accounting controls re-
garding the accounting books, records and accounts are the safeguarding
of accountability of assets, and assuring the reliability of financial reports
of a corporate enterprise. 5 The terms "safeguarding" and "reliability" are
not used in the absolute sense, but rather consistently with common sense
and good accounting practice. Authoritative accounting literature suggests
that the term, "safeguarding of assets" implies a system that must account
for the assets by a maintenance of records of accountability for assets and
a periodic reconciliation of such records with the related assets." While
accounting controls cannot insure that the stated objectives in every in-
stance will be attained, an adequate system includes both complete record
input and an effective double-check feature.
The details of a program of controls, the amount of time and energy
spent devising and implementing, and the depth and frequency of the
checking and verifying functions must be decided on the basis of reasona-
bleness. Part of this standard is an assessment of the costs as offset against
the benefits. To account properly and effectively for assets, of course, a
7 Subsection B, supra notes 3, 51.




system should determine that actual assets, as defined in authoritative
accounting literature, agree with those reflected in the accounting books,
records and accounts of a corporation, and that acquisitions and disposi-
tions of assets are recorded consistently with corporate authorizations and
executions of such transactions. The question of authorization, in the con-
text of the mechanics of the system, does not refer to the exercise of busi-
ness judgment in the transaction but rather to the proper reflection of the
transaction in the accounting books and records in accordance with man-
agement's authorization. Further, proper internal accounting controls re-
quire the inventorying of assets. With respect to that inventory, "[t]he
action that may be appropriate with respect to any discrepancies revealed
by the comparison of recorded accountability with assets will depend pri-Imarily on the nature of the asset, the system in use, and the amount and
cause of the discrepancy." A system of controls should be capable of
revealing material discrepancies in any event, and probably of revealing a
lower threshold, particularly if the discrepancies are likely to be repetitious
or particularly sensitive or significant to the corporate enterprise. The
FCPA itself does not expressly provide for any test of materiality, but
reference to accounting practices demonstrates a common sense approach.
The standards set forth in authoritative accounting literature recognize
that the costs may at some point exceed the benefits, and the reach of
accounting controls should be limited accordingly.
The definition of accounting control comprehends reasonable, but
not absolute, assurance that the objectives expressed in it will be
accomplished by the system. The concept of reasonable assurance
recognizes that the cost of internal control should not exceed the
benefits expected to be derived. The benefits consist of reductions
in the risk of failing to achieve the objectives in the definition of
accounting control.
7 8
The actual costs of any internal accounting control and the real benefits
derived from its use may be somewhat indefinite, particularly in the ab-
sence of substantial previous experience. Accounting control procedures
therefore may be applied on a test basis if this is an appropriate response
to the cost-benefit analysis of a given situation. The legislative history of
the FCPA, in a similar vein, indicates that Congress recognized manage-
ment's need for discretion to draw the line between worthwhile and exces-
sively burdensome techniques, based on a standard of reasonableness, be-
cause management had the best practical grasp of the real impact of any
accounting system. 0
Deferring where appropriate to inangement's judgment and allowing




" SENATE REPORT, supra note 20, at 4106.
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ing system can be perfect. The Senate Committee recognized explicitly
"that no system of internal accounting controls is perfect, and that there
will always be room for improvement."8 ' The Commission has taken a
similar position:
[s]ystems of controls will, of course, vary from company to com-
pany. The size of the business, diversity of operations, degree of
centralization of financial and operating management, amount of
contact by top management with day-to-day operations, and nu-
merous other circumstances are factors which management must
consider in establishing and maintaining an internal accounting
controls system. The design of any such system necessarily in-
volves exercise of management's judgment, and entails the balanc-
ing of the cost of implementing any given internal accounting con-
trol against the benefit to be derived. 2
The meaning of the term "reasonable assurances" should be taken from
accounting literature." The Commission elaborated on this theme in the
SEC May 12 Report, recognizing that the accounting profession had long
considered internal accounting controls an important management func-
tion, and had developed a body of objectives and guides. The Commission
stated that it was "satisfied that the specifications of the objectives of a
system of internal accounting controls found in accounting literature can
be readily understood by issuers and accountants.""' The Commission fur-
ther stated, "no system can insure or guarantee complete success, but the
Commission believes its approach is the appropriate one to address the
problems we have observed." 5 The Commission's position is particularly
important in that (1) reliance is placed on accounting literature, and (2)
the significant statement is made that "[n]o system can insure or guaran-
tee success, but the Commission believes its approach is the appropriate
one to address the problems we have observed." An appropriate approach,
therefore, stresses not perfection but reasonable and efficient systems that
provide adequate checking procedures without being impractical. In the
words of the Senate Report on S. 3664:
[riequiring companies to devise, establish, and maintain an ade-
quate system of internal 'accounting controls is not a panacea.
Likewise it is not a requirement that is intended to be enforced
without regard to the point at which the costs associated with a
particular corporate system of internal accounting controls exceeds
91 Id.
12 SEC Exchange Act Release No. 13185, (January 19, 1977), reprinted in [1976-77
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,896.
3 Id.
" See SEC May 12 Report, supra note 20, at 59. The Commission has adopted the view
that the structure of accounting systems will involve managerial judgments based upon cost
benefit analysis. See SEC Release No. 13185, supra note 82.
" SEC Release No. 13185, supra note 82.
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the benefits that flow from the system .... The Committee recog-
nizes that no system of internal controls is perfect and that there
will always be room for improvement."
The environmental setting in which an accounting system functions
influences greatly the degree of accuracy and reliability attainable. Ac-
counting literature on the subject highlights the concepts -of management
responsibility,87 competence and integrity of personnel,M and segregation
of functions.8 Deliberate collusion, of course, is a different problem, since
any internal accounting control system can be circumvented by design.
Minor errors or insignificant irregularities may not be caught by an inter-
nal accounting control system designed on a reasonable cost-benefit basis.
The necessity for a proper control environment and the importance of
accuracy and diligence should not prevent management from exercising
prudent business judgment and taking proper business risks in accordance
with corporate objectives, and the maximization of profit, nor should it
adversely affect the procedures and conduct entering into management's
rational decision-making process. Members of management should not be
liable for an honest mistake of business judgment made within the scope
of their responsibility. A stricter standard would freeze initiative and per-
haps operate against the company's best interests. The requirements of the
FCPA with respect to the recording of transactions demand, however, that
management oversee authorization of transactions. Managerial overseeing
must include general verifications in accordance with management's au-
thorization, that transactions received proper initial authorizations that
employees or agents executing transactions were properly authorized, that
the transactions were executed within the terms of the authorizations, and
that the transactions were duly recorded. °
While management bears a heavy responsibility for seeking reliable
corporate financial records, the requirements of the FCPA should not be
construed to infringe on the internal systems management adopts-or its use
of information solely for internal business purposes aside from those func-
tions clearly subject to the internal accounting control system. Authorita-
tive accounting literature points out that one interpretation of accounting
controls with respect to the reliability of records could lead to the conclu-
sion that they cover "such internal management purposes as establishing
sales policies and prices, estimating future costs . . .or other. lines of
responsibility . . .greater than those required to provide reliability for
external reporting purposes."'" Information may be compiled and used by
a corporation internally, in ways not comporting with the requirements of
M SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, CORRUPT PRACTicEs BY U.S.
BUSINESS ENTERPRISES, S. REP. No. 1031, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1976).
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the FCPA for external reporting. Such internal use should be distinguished
from external reporting and the necessity of compliance with the FCPA.
Additional financial reporting safeguards are necessary, but the extent to
which a control system must be detailed and thorough is limited by reason-
ability. Similarly, the cost of monitoring information used solely for some
internal purposes by the corporation at some point exceeds the benefit of
thoroughness and reliability of records.
The subsection B provisions require that management take steps to
protect and safeguard assets. To achieve that objective, access to assets
must be limited to authorized personnel92 by implementing necessary pro-
cedures and practices with full explanation to employees. Reasonable ac-
cess procedures coupled with a double-checking of records against the
physical assets should be sufficient to discharge management's duty in this
regard.
The objective of safeguarding assets, while important to the statutory
scheme, is neither the primary function of management nor the central
element in management decision-making. The FCPA may be broadly in-
terpreted to state that the protection of existing assets and acquisition of
additional assets is the primary function of management and, therefore,
that any procedures or records entering into management's decision-
making process are subject by this element of the definition of corporate
records to the full structure of the FCPA.5 3 Data may be used internally
for the purpose of making business decisions. The result of business deci-
sions is an impact on operations in terms of contracts entered into, sales
made, net profit and other significant items and measures. These items go
into the results of operations which are disseminated externally and ac-
cepted as an accurate record of corporate performance, documentation of
existing assets and a reading of corporate financial health. At this point
the general structure of internal controls interfaces with the reliability of
financial statements. The Report of the Special Advisory Committee on
Internal Accounting Control concludes "that an internal accounting con-
trol is one that is concerned with the reliability of financial statements and
with the broad internal control objectives of authorization, accounting,
and asset safeguarding and, further, that accounting controls should ex-
tend to all external reports of historical financial information." 4
The definition of "material weaknesses" in an accounting system given
in accounting literature95 is in keeping with the criteria of reasonableness.
12 Id. 320.42.
13 Id. 320.14.
"4 AICPA, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL ACCOUNTING
CONTROL, 11 (1979).
11 See AICPA STATEMENT No. 1, supra note 37, 320.68, in which "material weakness"
is defined as:
a condition in which the auditor believes the prescribed procedures or the degree
of compliance with them does not provide reasonable assurance that errors or irreg-
ularities in amounts that would be material in the financial statements being au-
dited would be prevented or detected within a timely period by employees in the
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While the FCPA itself does not say "material weakness," the term
"weakness" is used. The definition of "weakness" should be taken from the
concept of "material weakness" as defined in authoritative accounting
literature. Basically, a weakness in internal accounting controls should be
considered a condition in the procedures or the degree of compliance with
them which prevents a reasonable assurance that errors or irregularities
requiring correction could be prevented or timely detected. An adequate
system must ensure that errors that lead to material misstatements or
omissions in financial statements be detected. Once errors are detected,
management of course has the obligation to correct the errors and revise
the procedures.
Using a standard of reasonableness in construing the FCPA, the exist-
ence of material errors in a corporation's financial statements constitutes
an indication of a violation of the Subsection B provisions. The persons
involved in causing the irregularities in the accounting system or its imple-
mentation could be subject to the sanctions of the 1934 Act in accordance
with the nature of the irregularities. A more troublesome problem for man-
agement is prospectively determining whether its internal accounting con-
trols are sufficient. In fact, a continuing assessment is mandated because
irregularities may develop in internal accounting controls that were suffi-
cient in the past. Since such flaws could not reasonably have been antici-
pated, management must make periodic checks and examinations. Im-
provements to the system should always be encouraged.
A corporation could be subject to sanctions under the 1934 Act based
on the development of reasonably foreseeable irregularities, if the relevant
remedial internal accounting controls could be justified on a cost-benefit
basis. Similarly, a member of management making a representation re-
garding the sufficiency of such controls might be subject to sanction, de-
pending on the circumstances. As further developments better define pro-
per internal accounting controls, obviously reasonable views will differ as
to whether or not a weakness exists in internal accounting controls, even
where no error or flaw has become apparent. There may be an obligation
to correct a system containing a theoretical error, even though no actual
fault has yet occurred. Nevertheless, the law must give fair and reasonable
recognition to the efforts of management to review and improve its system
of internal accounting controls and encourage the development and refine-
ment of accounting control techniques and practices. An overly strict stan-
dard of liability is inappropriate and out of keeping with the criteria of
reasonableness to be applied to the bookkeeping and internal accounting
control provisions of the FCPA.
The Commission has actually noted that a negligence standard will
govern civil injunctive actions brought to enforce the 1934 Act. 6 State
normal course of performing their assigned functions.
This definition is repeated in AICPA STATEMENT ON AUDITING STANDARDS No. 20, REQUIRED
COMMUNICATION OF MATERIAL WEAKNESSES IN INTERNAL ACCOUNTING CONTROL 11, 12 (1977).
" See SEC Exchange Act Release No. 14478, supra note 45.
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corporate and agency law concepts, as affirmed in Green, should govern
most internal affairs of a corporation. State law generally provides that
management should exercise reasonable control and supervision of its
employees. Under such concepts of corporate law, management may be
chargeable where it has participated in fraudulent or wrongful acts of
others, and may be chargeable with neglect of duty for failure to supervise
employees. Ordinarily the harm suffered must be the result of a culpable
failure of management with respect to the selection or supervision of em-
ployees. However, management should not be liable for losses due only to
imprudence or honest errors of judgment" without some further shortcom-
ing.
The possible liability of management, of course, depends on the extent
of the scope and coverage of the FCPA. The weight of authority indicates
that control procedures need not embrace everything the corporation does,
nor extend to all paperwork its operations generate. As previously men-
tioned, accounting literature98 distinguishes "administrative controls"
from "accounting controls" and includes within administrative controls
"the plan of organization and the procedures and records that are con-
cerned with the decision processes leading to management's authorization
of transactions .... [Such authorization] is the starting point for estab-
lishing accounting control of transactions." Examples of administrative
controls might be records pertaining to customers contacted by salesmen
and to employees' records relating to evaluation of performance." Some
controls, however, may be viewed as both accounting and administrative
controls.
The Commission concurs in this distinction, as indicated by its state-
ment that "[tihe term 'internal accounting controls' does not ordinarily
encompass all corporate policies and procedures. Matters of efficiency,
employee relations, and production quality control, for example, should
not be confused with the accounting controls established to insure the
reliability of financial information." 1 0 Internal accounting controls must
cover those documents and materials directly affecting the reliability of
financial statements, but need not extend to all corporate records and
matters of any nature. Management's responsibility, and concomitant lia-
bility, is accordingly limited.
97 See generally H. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS 156-80 (rev. ed. 1946); H. HENN, LAW OF
CORPORATIONS 453-57 (1970); W. KNEPPER, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS
109-21 (3d ed. 1978).
" AICPA STATEMENT No. 1, supra note 37, 320.47. Administrative controls include
recording such information as the customers contacted by salesmen and employee evaluation
data. Id. 320.29.
" Id. 320.29.
01 SEC Exchange Act Release No. 13185 (January 19, 1977), reprinted in [1976-77




A. Rules 13b2-1 and 13b2-2
Rule 13b2-1 issued by the Commission in February 1979,101 makes it
illegal for any person to directly or indirectly falsify, or cause to be falsified,
any corporate books and records subject to the accounting provisions of the
FCPA. Rule 13b2-2 prohibits any officer or director from making a materi-
ally false, misleading or incomplete statement to an accountant in connec-
tion with an audit or examination of financial'statements, or the prepara-
tion or filing of any document or report with the Commission. The purpose
of the Rules is to implement the substantive provisions of the FCPA, but
their impact may extend further than implementation. Two prominent
questions raised by these rules are whether a scienter test must be applied
to determine violations and whether the rules extend to indirect represen-
tations of various sorts.
1. Scienter
Whether -negligent conduct on the part of management can violate the
FCPA's substantive provisions is unclear. Similar uncertainty adheres in
the application of the new Rules. The Commission specifically rejected in
the new Rules any scienter or knowingly test.' 2 The Senate in S. 305,
101 See SEC Exchange Act Release No. 15570 (February 23, 1979), reprinted in [1979
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,959. These provisions were set forth in 17
C.F.R. § 240.13b-1, "Falsification of accounting records," and 17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-2,
"Issuer's representations in connection with the preparation of required reports and docu-
ments," with the additions underscored and deletions bracketed, and were modeled after
proposed sections 13(b)3 and (b)4 of the SEC May 12 Report, and subsequently issued as
proposed rules in SEC Exchange Act Release No. 13185 (January 19, 1979). The provisions
read as follows:
[(b)(3)] No [It shall be unlawful for any] person shall directly or indirectly, [to]
falsify, or cause to be falsified, and book, record[,] or account [or document made
or required to be made for any accounting purpose, of any issuer subject to section
12 of this title or which is required to file reports pursuant to Section 15(d) of this
title.] subject to Section 13(b)(2)(A) of the Securities Exchange Act.
[(b)(4)] No director or officer of an issuer shall [It shall be unlawful for any
person], directly or indirectly,
(a) [A to make] Make[,] or cause to be made[,] a materially false or
misleading statement, or
(b) [B to omit] Omit to state[,] or cause another person to omit to state,
any material fact necessary in order to make statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading to an ac-
countant in connection with (1) any audit or examination [any examination or
audit of an issuer which has a class of securities registered pursuant to section 12
of this title or which is required to file reports pursuant to Section 15(d) of this title,
or in connection with any examination or audit of an issuer with respect to an
offering registered or to be registered under the Securities Act of 1933.] of the
financial statements of the issuer required to be made pursuant to this subpart or
(2) the preparation or filing of any document or report required to be filed with the
Commission pursuant to this subpart or otherwise.
M0 Id. at 81,394.
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however, had inserted "knowingly" in appropriate places in the statute to
clarify that it did not intend to make unlawful "conduct which is merely
negligent." The Senate Report stated that only deliberate conduct was
unlawful:
[als explained to the committee, the term 'knowingly' connotes
a 'conscious undertaking.' Thus these paragraphs proscribe and
make unlawful conduct which is rooted in a conscious undertaking
to falsify records or mislead auditors through a statement or con-
scious omission of material facts." 3
The Rules should follow the statutory standard if there is in fact no
requirement of scienter. The question of whether scienter must be shown
to establish a violation of the FCPA, and therefore of the rules promulgated
thereunder, may be for the courts to answer. A scienter test must be ap-
plied in some contexts under the federal securities laws, as demonstrated
by Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder.1" Whether the Hochfelder requirements
pertain to other statutory provisions is an open question. The legislative
history did not resolve that issue, nor did Congress take a direct position
as to whether the Commission has rulemaking authority to decide the
standard of liability. The Conference Report, noting that the Senate's
version of the statute was deleted in conference, indicated that Congress
did not wish to raise the issue of whether the inclusion or deletion of
"knowingly" would or would not "affirm, expand or overrule the decision
of the Supreme Court in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder (425 U.S. 185) ....
[As regards the question of application of a scienter test] . . .the confer-
ees intend that no inference should be drawn with respect to any rulemak-
ing authority the SEC may or may not have under the securities laws."'0 5
The language used by the Commission in the rules, however, referring to
"falsify or cause to be falsified" strongly implies that liability will turn on
some degree of active conduct beyond negligence.
The history of Rule 13b2-1 indicates that unlawful conduct should be
willful whether the violation arises by omission or commission. The objec-
tive of Rule 13b2-1 is to prevent false or misleading accounting reports.
Individuals who are directly responsible for a falsification of accounting
books and records are held accountable under the Rule. Speaking of an
earlier version of Rule 13b2-1, the Commission in its May 12 Report' 6
stated that the Rule "prohibits not only affirmative false statements but
also the failure to make entries, or the failure to obtain or create docu-
ments, necessary for proper accounting records." In a Release under the
1934 Act, the Commission stated in part:
[i]n many cases, instances of concealed corporate payments and
off-book cash funds have resulted from the activities of particular
103 SENATE REPORT, supra note 20, at 9.
11 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
10' CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 47, at 10-11.
10 SEC May 12 Report, supra note 20, at 66.
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individuals, acting with or without the knowledge or authorization
of top management, to cause such transactions to be improperly
reflected on the corporate records. Proposed Rule 13b-3
[predecessor rul ] would permit the Commission to take action
to preclude such individuals from further frustrating either the
system of corporate recordkeeping or the broader system of ac-
countability by which management monitors the activities of the
entire array of individuals entrusted with corporate assets.07
Several general rationales may serve to mitigate the potentially severe
results of enforcing the statute, and the Rules, in the absence of a scienter
requirement. First, the Commission takes the position that the statutory
requirements embody a standard of reasonableness, diminishing the im-
pact of the lack of a scienter standard of liability. The Commission has
pointed to the use of the phrase "in reasonable detail" in Subsection A of
the FCPA as a basis for its interpretation and to alleviate much of the
concern expressed'in comments. 0° On this ground, the Commission dis-
missed as unwarranted the concern that inadvertent or inconsequential
errors could lead to liability, and declined to make any specific changes in
the rules. The Commission's rationale continues to be that "[t]he statute
does not xequire perfection but only that books, records and accounts 'in
reasonable detail,' accurately and fairly reflect the transactions . . .
[and] [i]n addition, the legislative history reflects that 'standards of
reasonableness' are to be used in applying this provision.'
'0 9
In this connection, it should be noted that the lack of an express materi-
ality criteria for accounting errors or omissions arguably would lead to
liability for minor errors without wilfullness. A standard of reasonableness
may serve to mitigate this further problem.
Finally, as a general matter the lack of more specific statements or
guidelines is based in part on a desire that the FCPA have a type of in
terrorem effect. New Rule 13b2-2 is meant to "act as a deterrent to the
falsification of corporate books, records and accounts and to the making
of false, misleading or incomplete statements to an accountant or auditor
that might conceal the falisification of such books and records by any
officer or director of a publicly held corporation.""' This enforcement pos-
ture is clear, and is not unique to the FCPA. Even so, this comfort is less
than complete in that the Commission is free at any time to change its
approach and prosecute for negligence without scienter.
M SEC Exchange Act Release No. 13185 (January 19, 1977), reprinted in [1976-77
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,896 at 87,830 (emphasis added).
'1 SEC Exchange Act Release No. 15570 (February 23, 1979), reprinted in [1979 Trans-
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2. Scope
The new Rules impose a standard of care that prohibits officers and
directors from making false, incomplete or misleading statements to ac-
countants in connection' with audits. The Commission has stated that:
the new rule encompass[es] the audit of financial statements by
independent accountants, the preparation of any required reports,
whether by independent or internal accountants, the preparation
of special reports to be filed with the Commission, as for example,
those filed pursuant to judicial orders incident to Commission en-
forcement proceedings, and any other work performed by an ac-
countant that culminates in the filing of a document with the
Commission."'
The Rule applies to oral statements as well as to written representations,
however, and care must be exercised to avoid any misunderstandings
which could result in a possible violation.
Indirect representations to the Commission raise more difficult prob-
lems. These may be described generally as representations made between
parties while preparing to file information with the Commission. These
include written representations furnished by management to independent
auditing firms often designated "Client Representations."' Material con-
firmations or representations made by officers or directors to other parties,
such as attorneys and experts, stand on the same footing. Accountants,
attorneys, experts and others rely on these statements in preparing the
registration documents and rendering the opinions contained therein. Con-
sequently, these representations might be deemed to be made indirectly
to the Commission, and, in any case, could be covered by the provisions
of the Rules.
In the course of preparing financial statements to be filed with the
Commission, management may be asked by the auditing committee to
give representations of compliance with the FCPA and the rules thereun-
der. Even if the accounting controls program is excellent, personnel in the
operational departments of the corporation may nonetheless violate the
law. Management may be unaware of such violations when called upon to
make representations. For this reason, as a practical matter, "negative
confirmations" may be desirable, stating generally that management has
taken reasonable steps to institute an adequate system of internal account-
ing controls and is aware of no violations of the law."' Negative confirma-
tions by management are indirect representations, subject to the same
problems of compliance with the FCPA.
Id.
112 Id.
"I See AICPA STATEMENT ON AUDITING STANDARDS No. 10, CLIENT REPRESENTATIONS
(1977).
"I Hinsey, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act - The Legislation As Enacted, July 1979
FINANCIAL EXECUTIVE 12, 18.
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Further, the indirect test arguably extends to cover negative confirma-
tions given by officers and directors of a registrant in the context of an
entirely different responsibility. If an individual occupies responsible posi-
tions in two entities, and one entity is required to make representations or
negative confirmations to the other, then that individual could suffer lia-
bility arising from deficiencies in those confirmations. For example, an
individual may be an officer or director of a publicly held corporation, and
a director of a bank with which that corporation maintains an account.
Upon request for confirmation of the account, or other asset, the bank may
supply to the corporation a negative confirmation. If the bank is mistaken
with respect to that confirmation, that mistake may be considered a
"misrepresentation" under the Rules, subjecting the individual to liabil-
ity. The Rules seem to allow this extension in scope, even though such
extrapolation was uncontemplated by the FCPA. In this entire area of
indirect representations, common sense and good judgment should be ap-
plied to avoid unreasonable standards or harsh results not anticipated by
the terms of the FCPA.115
The desirability of a common sense approach is especially evident in
light of the Commission's position that the record-keeping and internal
accounting controls provisions of the FCPA provide additional grounds for
enforcement. The Commission has stated that "[tihe new requirements
may provide an independent basis for enforcement action by the Commis-
sion, whether or not violation of the provisions may lead, in a particular
case, to the dissemination of materially false or misleading information to
investors.""' 6 The Rules provide the Commission with the right to pursue
corporation employees at any level for alleged violations of the accounting
provisions of the FCPA. The farther down the ladder of responsibility the
corporate employee is found, however, the weaker the deterrence rationale
becomes. Whether the Rules themselves, without some knowing falsifica-
tion in registration statements or reports, provide a basis for enforcement
actions at all seems debatable. Any grounds on which the Commission
proceeds must surely be tempered by a reasonable reading both of the
statute and the Rules.
"I The Commission has indicated that although its new rules do not expressly apply to
persons who are unaffiliated with the reporting company, the 1934 Act's general antifraud
provisions will continue to govern those persons' liability for misleading the issuer's accoun-
tants. Specific reference to those antifraud provisions is made following the statement that:
[it must be stressed, however, that the exclusion from the express language of the
new Rule of shareholders, low-level corporate employees of an issuer, and persons
unaffiliated with the issuer does not indicate that those individuals may mislead
the issuer's accountants with impunity.
SEC Exchange Act Release No. 15570 (February 15, 1979), reprinted in [1979 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 81,959, at 81,300.
118 Id.
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B. Proposed Rules
On April 30, 1979, the Commission issued proposed rules requiring
management to make a statement regarding the adequacy of the corpora-
tion's internal accounting controls under the 1934 Act. ' 7 The proposed
rules would require inclusion of the statement in Form 10-K and in annual
reports to security holders. For accounting periods ending after December
15, 1980, management would be required to give an opinion as to whether
during specified periods the system of internal accounting control provided
reasonable assurances that specified objectives of internal accounting con-
trol were achieved. The statement of management would be required to be
examined and reported on by an independent public accountant. Lesser
requirements would be imposed for the period ending after December 15,
1979 and prior to December 16, 1980. The proposed rules in effect would
require management of a reporting corporation to affirm compliance with
the substantive internal accounting control provisions of the FCPA. In
addition to any cause of action based on liability provisions of federal
securities laws, or on the statutory terms of the FCPA itself, the Commis-
sion could be able to proceed against any individual on the basis of a false
affirmation of compliance with the FCPA. Further, the proposed rules
would have the effect of creating an express private remedy, in that a
deficient certificate of management itself is a violation of section 13(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act to which the liability provisions of section 18
apply."" The course the Commission has pursued in proposing this rule
raises serious questions of statutory authorization, due process and the
scope and extent of rule-making."9 The comments submitted regarding
this rule will no doubt reflect grave concern over the advisability of these
requirements and significant doubt as to whether the Commission in fact
has authority to promulgate such a standard.' 0 In effect the Commission
has set up an additional requirement that management must perform, and
on which liability may be based. This is another indication that the Com-
mission thinks the rules provide an independent basis for enforcement, but
goes even farther in asserting liability based not on an administrative
interpretation of statutory terms, but solely on failure to give a certificate
not mentioned in the statute and required only by a Commission rule.
In addition, Release No. 34-15772,21 in discussing the evaluation of
internal accounting controls, focuses on the "overall control environment"
"I SEC Exchange Act Release No. 15772 (April 30, 1979), reprinted in [1979 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,063.
"I Letter dated July 31, 1979 from the American Bar Association to the Securities and
Exchange Commission, in response to Securities Exchange Act Release No. 15772 (April 30,
1979) (copies on file with the Commission).
ll Id.
12 See generally Olsen, Accounting Proposals: Negative Comments, Legal Times of
Wash., September 17, 1979, at 14.
121 SEC Exchange Act Release No. 15772 (April 30, 1979), reprinted in [1979 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,063.
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as distinguished from the "internal accounting control environment.' 2 2
The Release describes this "overall control environment," in part, as
"careful exercise of management's judgment. . . communication of corpo-
rate procedures, policies and related codes of conduct; communication of
authority and responsibility . . . [and] accountability for performance
and for compliance with policies and procedures... ."' The propriety and
legality of requiring a management compliance statement and expanding
the scope of internal accounting controls are subject to serious questions.
This language expands the content of "control environment" significantly
beyond the analysis found in authoritative accounting literature. This arti-
cle has contended that accounting documentation, the presence of check-
ing procedures and an effort by management to examine and evaluate the
accounting system and its result constitute the basic features of the
"control environment." The Commission's approach, by contrast, includes
elements of management discretion and corporate codes of conduct as part
of an "overall control environment." Under the guise of accounting con-
trols, the Commission would foster a system of business ethics and a sub-
stantive evaluation of management. This effort by the Commission ex-
ceeds the bounds of its statutory authority and effectively amends the
provisions of the FCPA.
VII. CONCLUSION
The bookkeeping and internal accounting control provisions of the
FCPA should be interpreted and construed in light of authoritative ac-
counting literature. The legislative history indicates that Congress so in-
tended. To be fair and just, the FCPA requirements should be based on
authoritative criteria that are both well-established and widely known and
accepted. Accounting literature forms a consistent and well-known set of
principles to which affected accountants, attorneys and business people
can refer for guidance.
Considerations of reasonableness and practicability are also central to
an appropriate interpretation of the FCPA. No accounting system is per-
fect, and no individual performs duties flawlessly. While due diligence is
called for, corporate functioning should not be impeded unnecessarily; and
normal corporate operations should not be disrupted at all, absent sub-
stantive gains. While corporate accountability in a larger sense is certainly
worthwhile, the objectives of an accounting system must be clarity and
veracity. Substantive standards of corporate conduct and protections
against mismanagement should not be confused with an accounting sys-
tem.
The Commission has taken a different view, and the effect is clear on
" See AICPA REPORT OF THE SPECIAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL ACcOUNTING
CONTROL 12-19 (1979), which discusses "The Internal Accounting Control Environment."
121 SEC Exchange Act Release No. 15772 (April 30, 1979), reprinted in [1979 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 82,063, at 81,730.
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certain points of interpretation of the FCPA discussed in this article. The
Commission has stated that the FCPA is not exclusively concerned with
the preparation of financial statements, but that "[a]n equally important
objective of the law . . . is the goal of corporate accountability."'' 24 The
Commission has also stated that the provisions of the FCPA have estab-
lished "requirements concerning the internal activities of reporting compa-
nies . . . [and] may provide an independent basis for enforcement action
by the Commission, whether or not violation of the provisions may lead,
in a particular case, to the dissemination of materially false or misleading
information to investors.""' As mentioned at the beginning of this article,
corporate accountability is much broader than the accounting provisions
of the FCPA and its does not seem feasible or reasonable to expect that
such provisions could be viewed as imposing recordkeeping and internal
accounting controls with respect to all notions or concepts of corporate
accountability. The legislative history and the SEC May 12 Report do not
support a broad application of the accounting provisions of the FCPA to
corporate accountability, nor to all of the internal affairs and business of
a company.
Commission statements demonstrate a theoretical perception that the
rules promulgated pursuant to the FCPA form a basis in and of themselves
upon which to bring enforcement actions. Further, these rules could be
construed to cover violations of corporate codes of conduct, failure to follow
internal policies and procedures or carelessness and lack of management
oversight. Actions may thus be instituted solely on the basis of insufficient
management involvement, director oversight or lack of management integ-
rity. The materiality of the error, the level of responsibility at which it
occurred, the harm suffered by the the corporation or the public and even
whether any misleading or erroneous statement resulted at all may be
irrelevant. This position seems extreme, inflexible and impractical, and
raises difficult and disturbing questions regarding the Commission's au-
thority.
While the Commission has a responsible oversight role to be exercised
in the public interest to see that the accounting provisions of the FCPA
are fully complied with by all publicly held corporations, the power and
prerogative of rule application urge restraint. The Commission has the
power to exact consent decrees, including terms that affect the composi-
tion and duties of a corporation's board of directors and audit committee,
the duties of officers, and procedures and policies followed within the
conduct of the business and affairs of a corporation. Such far reaching
authority should be exercised only when necessary.
Statements made by the Commission indicate that it may give weight
to the good faith efforts of corporations which have adopted well articu-
lated, consistent and adequate policies on these matters. Such policies
ZI SEC Exchange Act Release No. 15570 (February 15, 1979), reprinted in [1979 Trans-




should include procedures and guidelines concerning general corporate
conduct, standards for corporate policies concerning management authori-
zations and delegations of authority and encouragement to conduct corpo-
rate operations and affairs in accordance with law. In such cases, the
Commission would review the extent to which such policies, procedures
and guidelines are adequately disseminated, administered, and moni-
tored'26 as an element in assessing the corporation's performance.
In light of the differences of opinion among commentators and the
severe position the Commission may take, the extent to which the provi-
sions of the FCPA and the Commission's rules thereunder effect the inter-
nal affairs of corjorations and impose an independent set of duties and
liabilities on management will probably be left to judicial determination.
Only by construing the FCPA with reference to the accounting literature
and standards of reasonableness can the intent of Congress be realized
without undue interference with corporate functioning. While accounting
procedures can be one tool to achieve accountability, the overall goal is
beyond the reach of mechanical requirements.
"' See, e.g., SEC v. Killearn Properties [1977-78 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 1 96,256 (N.D. Fla. 1977). In Kifleam, the court charged the defendant company's
board of directors' audit committee with the duties to monitor compliance with the com-
pany's code of conduct.
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